Building a battlefield for authenticated encryption

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago

Krovetz-Rogaway, tomorrow:

Look at how slow AES-GCM is!

Cycles/byte for 4096-byte authenticated encryption:

- 3.73 on Core i5-650.
- 3.88 in 32-bit mode.
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